
Your IT facility consists of a number of critical design and infrastructure features which, in combination, should render the area fully resilient to most types of disaster. ContinuitySA will carefully assess your IT facility to determine if there are any weaknesses in the design and installation which create serious vulnerabilities and which may even negate the considerable expense your company incurred in commissioning and maintaining the facility.
The following pages highlight the most important components, section by section, in order to illustrate the important contribution each makes to the overall integrity of design and effectiveness, and the possible risk and impact of poor design or application.
You will notice that there is an extremely high level of interdependency between components. For example spending exorbitant amounts of money on fire suppression systems will be wasted if perimeter walls are not to the required floor–to–slab (and fire resistant) specification. Similarly, if ceiling tiles in the computer facility are loose and exposed to the ceiling void, an expensive gas suppression system will have little effect.
Your IT area should have raised flooring for two primary reasons: Raised floors permit cables to be securely hidden from view (and tampering), and prevent the cables from being trampled upon or tripped over, causing damage to cabling and interruptions to IT functionality. Power cables underneath raised floors should be housed in elevated conduit piping to prevent water damage to circuits.
The second important role the raised floor offers is the ability to duct cooled air under floor via perforated tiles, thus venting air in precisely the area required, (i.e. directly beneath each server rack). Hot spots invariably form in IT facilities with overhead condensers because the air is indiscriminately vented and cannot be channeled to exactly where it is required. Under floor venting solves that problem.
Raised flooring can, in turn, present its own set of risks; a broken or missing tile could cause injury if inadvertently stepped into, and the ceiling needs to be higher than normal to accommodate the space taken up by the floor void (although it is possible to procure low profile raised floor panels).
Ideally walls should be constructed with reinforced concrete. This structure has very good fire resistant and security properties. The disadvantages are cost, and your facility will invariably have to be purpose designed and built.
Brick perimeter walls provide well in excess of the recommended two hour fire rating. It is very important to ensure that walls extend from floor to slab (not floor to ceiling). Refer to the sections on fire suppression systems, ceilings and security for further information.
Although commonly found as perimeter walls in IT facilities, drywall partitioning is totally inadequate as it can easily be breached, and the structure is not fire resistant. Such walls expose your IT facility to unacceptable risk as statistical evidence indicates that fires begin in office areas before spreading to computer facilities.
The structure is also known as METAWALL. This configuration of drywall partitioning sandwiches a layer of steel between the Rhinoboard sections, raising its fire resistance to an acceptable two hour rating.
Having large glass panels housing the computer facility (fishbowl concept) may look impressive when management shows off the facility to selected guests, but how practical is such a structure?
Are the glass panels shatterproof? Glass panels have been known to shatter from the induced pressure following a gas suppression dump. Exploding shards of glass can cause significant damage and injury.
Is the glass fire proof? (See Glass windows)
Virtually every IT facility features a window, but is the glass fire resistant? If this is not the case what is the point of having two hour fire ratings on the perimeter walls, when the fire can propagate via the window? Fire resistant glass, such as PYRAN is accordingly recommended.
Many windows, (particularly those installed in drywall partitioning structures) have aluminium frames. Aluminium has a low melting point (660ºC); well below the temperature that glass begins to soften (approximately 1500ºC - if the glass hasn’t already shattered).
In the event of a fire the aluminium frame will rapidly degrade until the window falls out – allowing the fire to spread into your IT facility.
The preferred ceiling to have in your IT environment is concrete (the upper floor slab). The ceiling, together with the perimeter walls should ideally form an air-tight chamber - to promote the effectiveness of the gas suppression drop. This principle is severely compromised where ceiling tiles are installed.
The gas drop volume is calculated so as to saturate the confines of the computer room by pressurizing the area with fire retardant gas with predetermined concentration levels. This is known as the PLENUM effect.
This induced pressure can easily dislodge ceiling tiles and the pressurized gas will escape into the ceiling void. The situation is exacerbated when perimeter walls do not extend to the slab as the gas can escape to the wider ceiling void beyond the extent of the computer room. This loss in pressure in the computer room can neutralize the efficacy of the gas suppression system.
Doors to your area should have a two hour fire rating. Fire rated doors are characteristically very solid and heavy. The simplest way to determine whether a door is fire rated is to check the hinges. A fire rated door will have three and sometimes four heavy duty brass hinges.
There should invariably be at least two smoke detector heads in your IT facility. Smoke detectors operate on a “double knock” principle. The first detector will sound a localized alarm upon sensing smoke, and indicate on the fire alarm panel the zone in which smoke has been detected. At this stage it will await confirmation from a second smoke detector head of the presence of smoke. This “confirmation” process prevents inadvertent gas releases, which are both costly and disruptive.
Once the second detector identifies smoke the general fire alarm is activated, and will continue sounding for a predetermined period before gas dump activation. This is to provide sufficient time for personnel to evacuate the area prior to gas discharge. This period can be critical particularly where a hazardous gas such as CO² is commissioned.
Smoke detector heads should be installed directly above critical systems, and well away from overhead air conditioner vent outlets. Ducted air from the air conditioner blowing directly onto the smoke detector can render the detector totally ineffective.
Smoke detector activation plays a crucial role in triggering shunt trips, (Refer to Shunt Trips for additional explanation).
Fire detection systems should have back-up battery power.
(N.B. The report “Fire Suppression Systems Overview” should be read in conjunction with this document).
There are several categories of fire suppression systems in use. These can be broadly identified as follows:
Clean agents are so described because they leave little residue after discharge and the onerous task of cleaning equipment is accordingly kept to a minimum. Products which fall into this category began with NAF SIII (a replacement for Halon capable of functioning on the same plumbing reticulation – all other clean agents operate at higher pressures and consequently require a complete reinstallation of all pipes, nozzles and storage vessels).
Other examples are FM 200, Inergen, Argonite and FE13. Their functionality either relies on the ability to suppress the chemical reaction which supports combustion (e.g. FM200), or alternatively reduce the level of oxygen in the protected environment to approximately12% (e.g. Inergen).
In 1987 Halon 1301 was banned under the Montreal Protocol, as an ozone depleting substance. Prior to its banning Halon was in wide use throughout the world.
Although hazardous, CO² remains commonly in use. The substance is very efficient in extinguishing fires; however as an asphyxiant it does not support life and is extremely dangerous. Areas protected by CO² should never have the gas suppression control panel set to automatic whilst the area is occupied, (refer to the following section for further explanation), and should always have emergency breathing apparatus on hand.
Water is used in a variety of methods. Conventional sprinklers can be used in a dry or wet pipe application; this is known as deluge spraying where the droplet size is approximately 1mm in diameter. Deluge spraying is effective and affordable, however cleaning and drying equipment afterwards can become a monumental task.
In any form of fire suppression using water as the medium, it is critical that shunt trips are employed to cut electrical power to live systems prior to water release.
In a wet pipe scenario the overhead pipes are charged with pressurized water at all times. The glass vial in each sprinkler head is set to self destruct at certain temperatures, releasing the water. Apart from the mess left in the aftermath of a deluge water release, an additional disadvantage is that it is usually not possible to strategically locate each sprinkler nozzle in the optimum location.
A dry pipe installation is characterized by all overhead pipes having no water in them. Upon double knock smoke detector activation a shunt will open the valve, allowing pressurized water to charge the overhead piping. The advantage of the dry pipe system is that it eliminates accidental discharge onto critical systems, as well as leaks developing overhead the computer equipment.
The alternative use of water is with a technique known as fogging. The difference between fogging and deluge is that the droplet size in fogging is approximately 1 micron in diameter and the system may use purified (distilled) water. The advantage of fogging is that water reticulation can occur within the raised floor void, and discharge heads can be located at precise and selected points. Moreover, the resultant clean-up requirement is substantially reduced.
These control panels are located externally to any gas protected facility. The setting should be to Automatic overnight and when the facility in unoccupied. When occupied the setting should be to Manual – requiring human intervention to actuate gas discharge. Inadvertent discharges have occurred, sometimes with fatal results in association with CO².
It is imperative that there is dual redundancy regarding air conditioners serving your IT facility
Ideally the units should be located outside the facility, with air ducted in. A preferred method is to have a down blower ducting air into the floor void, creating a PLENUM in the floor void, thus permitting the location of perforated tiles in precise positions for optimum effect.
Where split units are to be used, the motor/compressor assembly should be outside the facility, with only the fan/condenser assembly inside.
The reasons for external location are twofold; air conditioners can be a fire hazard, and secondly one must at all cost prevent non IT personnel from entering your IT facility. In the event of an air conditioner requiring a service, the service technician should be able to perform his task without accessing areas containing sensitive equipment and information.
Shunt trips can be likened to trip switches which are activated by certain events which the electrical circuit monitors. In the IT environment the shunt trips are activated by a double knock event.
In the event of a double knock, shunt trips will typically shut down (i.e. interrupt power supply) to:
Shunt trips may additionally invoke an automatic fire brigade call-out signal, and you will no doubt recall that the shunt trip opens the valve in a dry pipe sprinkler arrangement.
IT equipment is sensitive to environmental conditions such as temperature and humidity. After (?) hours failure of air conditioning equipment will result in a gradual rise in the ambient temperature within the facility, which could cause failure of IT platforms.
Temperature and humidity should be constantly monitored for anomalies. Technicians must be automatically notified by pager, SMS or telephone if limits are exceeded, to ensure that problems are rectified before any damage can occur.
Water detectors can be an important feature, particularly in a basement facility with drainage issues.
Emergency power supplied via diesel generators can be a critical feature if your organisation cannot tolerate an extended power outage. The system should be regularly load tested, serviced and maintained. Fuel should be tested annually for bacterial contamination.
As is the case with air conditioners, the UPS should ideally be located outside your IT facility. The UPS itself can be a fire hazard and accordingly should be housed in an area with fire detection and suppression.
Preventative maintenance will require periodic replacement of the batteries in line with the manufacturer’s recommendations.
Your IT facility should not be on the ground floor in a position where it could be damaged by vehicular traffic.
If your IT facility is located in an underground bunker arrangement, there must be equipment in place to detect water ingression and to control flooding.
In the event that your IT facility is north facing, the windows should be tinted to prevent sunlight overheating the area.
Perimeter walls constructed of drywall partitioning that only extend to the ceiling are a security risk as it is possible to climb into the ceiling of one office, move over the wall, and down through the ceiling into the adjacent area.
If your company uses CCTV cameras, it is important to establish where tapes are stored; the retention and rotation cycles; and whether the recording equipment is in a secure location.
Does your organisation permit tailgating at access control points? If a user does not swipe a card when entering an area, does your system permit that user to exit?
There are several health and safety issues that must be complied with. Does your company regularly perform evacuation drills? Are your fire marshals and first aiders regularly trained? Are your emergency exits well indicated and unobstructed? Does your emergency lighting function properly? In the event of a fire alarm, do your elevators descend to ground level and open all doors?
It should now be apparent that a properly designed IT facility has many non-negotiable attributes. If your facility has “evolved” over time from an office environment, it is unlikely to have much of all the above design criteria built in. Unfortunately once poor design is incorporated into your IT facility, it is virtually impossible to rectify the situation without rebuilding from scratch.
Contact ContinuitySA for your IT Facility Assessment.
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